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Abstract
Digital technology has recalibrated and become integrated with existing media institutions,
practices and power structures. From the perspective of movements, this hybridisedmedia envi-
ronment presents a new set of opportunities and constraints. Movementmessages can be directly
disseminated without relying on media ‘gatekeepers’, and a movement’s prominence on digital
platforms can translate into much broader reach via the ‘legacy’media, which continue to reach
the largest audiences. This article compares the extent to which two influential political move-
ments in the UK, the Corbyn movement and the movement for a People’s Vote, were able to
attract the attention of mainstreammedia ‘gatekeepers’ on Twitter. We do so first by identifying
core actors in bothmovements on Twitter, and then editors, political editors and digital editors at
major newsmedia outlets on the platform.We find that the People’s Votemovement attracted far
more attention from editors than the Corbynmovement, largely owing to the extent to which the
former integrated some key players from the British news media into its online network.
Keywords: Corbynism, People’s Vote, movements, Twitter, social network analysis
Introduction
THAT MEDIA MATTERS to movements is
obvious. Some of the first movements to mobi-
lise radicals and workers in Britain—the corre-
sponding societies—benefited from the growth
of mail coach networks. The revolutions in
America and France were encouraged by the
distribution of popular pamphlets, while the
success of the Protestant Reformation has been
causally tied to the spread of the printing press.
In response to political challenges from move-
ments, states have sought to influence the
media environment. Overt state censorship is
the most obvious example, but political elites
have employed more subtle mechanisms as
well. Shortly after the French Revolution, for
example, a restrictive Newspaper Publication
Act in Britain taxed journals in an attempt to
halt the spread of radicalism; this act in turn
became an object of repeal by radical move-
ments throughout the first half of the nineteenth
century. More recently, the approval by the
Thatcher government of Rupert Murdoch’s
takeover of the Times helped consolidate a pro-
market and Conservative hegemony in Britain.
From the perspective of movements, the media
environment presents a set of opportunities and
constraints; in the language of social movement
scholarship, media form an important part of a
movement’s political opportunity structure.
No wonder, then, that the interaction
between movements and the media—in par-
ticular, the former’s effort to communicate
their message and narrative via the latter—
has long been a preoccupation of social move-
ment scholars, particularly those interested in
how ‘interpretative frames’ are constructed
by movements’ interaction with other actors.1
While the flourishing of social movements in
the United States—particularly the protests
against the Vietnam War—is sometimes asso-
ciated with the influence of television, scholars
1For example, J. D. McCarthy, J. Smith and M. N.
Zald, Accessing Public, Media, Electoral, and Govern-
mental Agendas, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1996, pp. 291–311, among many others.
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have shown thatmedia institutions in the 1960s
followed the political agenda of elites, and
tended to delegitimise outsiders.2 According
to Edward Morgan, the mass media has
‘helped to shape, marginalize, and ultimately
constrain protest movements’.3 Unsurprisingly
the growth of digitalmedia, and socialmedia in
particular, has also been accompanied by sig-
nificant interest in how these technologies have
affected movements. Writing in 2015, Manuel
Castells welcomed the rise of digitally enabled
social movements, which he claimed had the
capacity to bring down corrupt governments
and fill the vacuum left by a crisis in social trust
and political legitimacy. For Castells, ‘internet
social networks … are spaces of autonomy,
largely beyond the control of governments
and corporations that had monopolized the
channels of communication as the foundation
of their power, throughout history’.4 The role
of social media in the so called Arab Spring
gave rise to a raft of optimistic commentary
and scholarship on the potential for new tech-
nology to challenge repressive states. Mean-
while, commentary elsewhere foresaw digital
networks as enabling greater democracy and
diversity in established media, particularly by
challenging the traditional elite orientation of
print and broadcast journalism.5
This early optimism, however, has given
way to growing concerns about the negative
influence of the internet on politics; concerns
that are frequently bound up with an anxiety
about what political commentators refer to as
illiberal populism.6 The experience of Brexit
and Donald Trump’s presidency has led to
widespread debate about the circulation of
misinformation and political propaganda
online, and an increased awareness that these
technologies can be used effectively by conser-
vative as well as egalitarian movements. A
related concern has been the extent to which
digital media platforms such as Facebook have
undermined the traditional business model of
private print and broadcast journalism; now
referred to as ‘legacy media’. Along with
well-publicised issues around privacy and tar-
geted advertising, and the realisation that dig-
ital media affords significant opportunities for
state surveillance, this has given rise to an intu-
itive sense for many of the toxifying and corro-
sive affordances of digital media for the public
sphere.
This shift in political commentary and
scholarship—from what, with hindsight,
appears to be an innocent optimism to now, a
general pessimism—reflects something of a
cyclical tendency in how innovations in com-
munication technology are typically received,
as the social movement scholars Fominaya
and Gillan have pointed out.7 Perhaps the
most fruitful approach is neither to celebrate
nor lament the influence of digital media, but
instead to examine the ways in which it is reca-
librating, and becoming integrated with, exist-
ing institutions, practices and power
structures. Given the increasingly hybrid
media environment, this means dispensing
with some popular dichotomies, considering
instead how the old interacts with the new,
the legacymedia with the digital environment,
and how hierarchies that exist offline shape
those online, and vice versa.
In the case of Twitter, which is the focus of
this article, the social media platform obvi-
ously allows for a more diverse range of per-
spectives than print or broadcast. However, it
is also the case that existing social inequalities
of ‘voice’ are readily reproduced. As a non-
reciprocal network, Twitter tends towards
centralisation. Users generally follow those
with more followers than themselves, and the
users with the highest following tend to be
those with a broader public profile or status.
2D. C. Hallin, The ‘Uncensored’ War: The Media and
Vietnam, Berkeley, University of California Press,
1986; T. Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass
Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980.
3E. P. Morgan, What Really Happened to the 1960s:
How Mass Media Culture Failed American Democracy,
Lawrence KS, University Press of Kansas,
2010, p. 11.
4M. Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social
Movements in the Internet Age, New Jersey, John
Wiley & Sons, 2010, p. 2.
5A. Hermida, ‘# Journalism: reconfiguring journal-
ism research about Twitter, one tweet at a time’,
Digital Journalism, vol. 1, no. 3, 2013, pp. 295–313.
6See, for example, Y. Mounk, The People
Vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is In Danger and
How To Save It, Cambridge MA, Harvard University
Press, 2018.
7C. Fominaya and K. Gillan, ‘Navigating the
technology-media-movements complex’, Social
Movement Studies, vol. 16, no. 4, 2017, pp. 383–402,
DOI: 10.1080/14742837.2017.1338943.
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For this reason Bastos, Raimundo and Tra-
vitzki write that Twitter ‘better resembles a
mixture of mass communication and face-to-
face communication’ than the ideal of a hori-
zontal network, or indeed the non-hierarchical
metaphor of the platform.8 Research in jour-
nalism studies has shown that Twitter has
been thoroughly integrated into the working
routines of ‘legacy’ or ‘mainstream’ news
media; that traditional elite-orientated sourc-
ing patterns have largely been maintained;
and that journalists tend to form highly insular
clusters. From the perspective of movements
operating in a hybrid media environment,
Twitter obviously presents certain communi-
cative opportunities. Movement messages
can be directly disseminated without relying
on media ‘gatekeepers’. But equally, a move-
ment actor’s prominence on the platform can
translate into a much broader reach via main-
stream media, since the platform is by far the
most popular social media site among journal-
ists, who, as studies have shown, regularly use
it for monitoring breaking news, gauging
political opinion and identifying sources, com-
mentators and pundits.9
One major obstacle to researching social
media is the overwhelmingly private nature
of the digital space, meaning access to data—
now a precious commodity—is hidden behind
the corporate curtain. Platforms do, however,
usually make certain data readily available
via their application programming interfaces
(APIs), which affords researchers some fruit-
ful, albeit still limited, avenues for social
research. Twitter is the most widely used plat-
form in academic research of social media, a
fact that largely owes to the availability of its
data in comparison to other companies. This
has prompted concerns among some
researchers of an ‘availability bias’. While we
therefore acknowledge calls to study ‘across
media’, Twitter remains a particularly useful
platform for our purposes since it is a key site
through which movement actors can hope to
influence ‘legacy’ media within an increas-
ingly hybridised media ecology.10 Our focus
here is not on our movements’ reach to a gen-
eral audience, either on Twitter or in the main-
stream news media. Rather, we examine the
extent to which core actors in the Corbyn
movement (or Corbynism) and the movement
for a People’s Vote (henceforth, the Remain
movement) were able to attract the attention
of mainstream news media gatekeepers on
the platform.
Both these movements were key players in
the three to four year period leading up to the
2019 general election. From his surprising elec-
tion as leader of the Labour Party in 2015, Jer-
emy Corbyn—in particular, his left-wing
political outlook, the enthusiastic movement
behind him and the fierce opposition he pro-
voked in his own party and elsewhere—was
at the centre of British politics. The Remain
movement, which grew in strength over the
same period, was initially galvanised by the
outcome of the EU referendum in 2016. It
mobilised hundreds of thousands of people
behind the demand for a second referendum,
which it dubbed a ‘People’s Vote’. The differ-
ent political and sociological character of these
two movements, that were often in tension
with one another, may, as we suggest in the
conclusion below, help explain the different
levels of attention they received from main-
stream media gatekeepers.
Methods
In order to identify the core actors in the Cor-
byn and Remain movements, we began by
reviewing existing work on the origin and
development of both movements, seeking to
identify key individuals and organisations.
For the Corbyn movement, we drew in partic-
ular on several books, as well as Lewis
8M. Bastos, R. Raimundo and R. Travitzki, ‘Gate-
keeping Twitter: message diffusion in political hash-
tags’, Media, Culture and Society, vol. 35, no. 2, 2013,
pp. 260–270.
9M. Broersma and T Graham, ‘Tipping the balance
of power. social media and the transformation of
political journalism’, in A. Bruns, G. Enli,
E. Skogerbo, A. O. Larsson and C. Christensen,
eds., The Routledge Companion to Social Media and Pol-
itics, London, Routledge, 2015, pp. 89–103;M. Logan
and R. Mour~ao, ‘Political journalists’ normalization
of Twitter: interaction and new affordances’, Jour-
nalism Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, 2019, pp. 248–66.
10E. Vraga, L. Bode, C. Wells, K. Driscoll and
K. Thorson, ‘The rules of engagement: comparing
two social protest movements on YouTube’, Cyberp-
sychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, vol. 17,
no. 3, 2012, pp. 133–40.
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Bassett’s own research.11 There has been far
less written about the Remain movement,
despite its powerful impact on British politics,
including on Corbyn’s Labour Party. Thus our
review mainly drew on political journalism,
including a number of longer-form investiga-
tive articles.12 From these surveys we pro-
duced a list of individuals and organisations
at the core of each movement, and for each of
these we identified a corresponding Twitter
account, where one existed. This yielded a
total of forty-nine Twitter accounts in the case
of the Corbyn movement and sixty-seven in
the case of Remain.With these Twitter handles
compiled, we then used the Microsoft Excel
add-on NodeXL, which facilitates data extrac-
tion from Twitter’s API, to scrape data from
the accounts, including every Twitter account
each user follows. Timelines for each user—
meaning the users’ tweets, retweets and
interactions—were also extracted (these were
limited at 500 tweets per user). This, and all
other data reported here, was collected in
October 2020. This time period meant the date
of data extraction was after the peaks of both
movements. However, we assumed that these
online networks would not have significantly
decomposed in the interim (an assumption
supported by our results).
Having identified all the Twitter accounts
followed by each of the core actors in each
movement, we were then able to produce
two directed follow networks (that is, a net-
work in which the accounts are linked to all
the users they follow, and those which follow
them); one for each movement. This then
allowed us to identify additional accounts that
are highly followed bymembers of eachmove-
ment. We used this data to augment our origi-
nal set of core movement actors with a second
set who appeared to be central to the move-
ment, but whom were not identified in our lit-
erature review. The basic guiding principle
here was that additional users should be
added if to do so would increase the overall
density of the initial follow network. Integrat-
ing additional users solely on the number of
additional following connections, however,
would mean adding users who are highly fol-
lowed by the core movement actors, but who
did not reciprocate. We therefore excluded
any users whose following of the core move-
ment actors was less than the average within
the initial follow network. In essence, we iden-
tified an additional set of Twitter users whose
followers and following suggested that they
‘belong’within eachmovement. This augmen-
tation process yielded an additional fifty-one
accounts for the Corbyn movement and an
additional eighty-five for the Remain move-
ment. The total Twitter accounts for the Cor-
byn movement elite was therefore 100 and
for the Remain movement 152. Three individ-
uals appeared in the networks of both move-
ments, namely the former Shadow
Chancellor John McDonnell, the Labour left-
wing MP Clive Lewis and the journalist
George Eaton.
With Twitter accounts for movement actors
now identified, the next step was to establish
to what extent the two movements attracted
the attention of mainstream media (MSM)
gatekeepers on Twitter. Although the term
MSM is often used by activists to imply certain
characteristics (frequently too left-wing or too
right-wing), our working definition of what
counts as ‘mainstream’ here is based simply
on the audience reach of news media outlets.
To determine this, we used polling data from
YouGov, commissioned by the Reuters Insti-
tute for its annual ‘Digital news report’.13 As
11See, for example, A. Nunns, The Candidate: Jeremy
Corbyn’s Improbable Path To Power, London, OR
Books, 2018; O. Jones, This Land: The Struggle For
The Left, London, Penguin, 2020; G. Pogrund and
P.Maguire, Left Out: The Inside Story Of Labour Under





(accessed 9 April 2021).
12This list included more than ten such articles. A
full list, along with the other data relevant to this
study, is available from the authors upon request.
13N. Newman, R. Fletcher, A. Kalogeropoulos and
R. Nielsen, ‘The Reuters Institute digital news
report’, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journal-
ism, 2019. Note that the questionnaire is conducted
online. The report notes that ‘online samples will
tend to under-represent the consumption habits of
peoplewho are not online (typically older, less afflu-
ent, andwith limited formal education). In this sense
it is better to think of results as representative of
online populations who use news at least once a
month.’ However, internet penetration in the UK is
also 95 per cent, according to the report.
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part of research conducted in 2019, YouGov
captured responses from 2,023 people
(weighted to represent a national sample).
Respondents were askedwhich online and off-
line sources of news they had used in the past
week. The responses are aggregated and listed
as percentages in Table 1.
With the major UK media outlets identified
we then drew up a list of key editorial decision
makers at those outlets, or what we refer to
here as MSM gatekeepers. We identified rele-
vant senior individuals for each outlet, divid-
ing roughly into editor, political editor and
digital editor. In the case of broadcast news
(BBC, ITV, Sky, Channel 4, Channel 5), we
focussed on editors and political editors at
each of the channel’s flagship news broad-
casts, plus their digital editors (excluding
Channel 5 for the latter, which doesn’t host
additional news via its website). In the case of
newspapers, we focussed on editors (online
and in print, where this distinction is relevant)
and political editors and/or senior political
correspondents. For each senior individual
we identified a corresponding Twitter
account, where one exists (five out of a total
of fifty-two individuals lacked Twitter
accounts). With the Twitter handles of MSM
gatekeepers identified, we then scraped the
accounts followed by each, allowing us to
identify their following of our two movement
networks.
Ultimately, we produced three quantitative
measures of our twomovements’ communica-
tive reach on Twitter. The first is the number of
followers a given user has on Twitter. The sec-
ond is the number of MSM gatekeepers who
follow the user. The third is a figure derived
from the second, but weighted according to
the relative audience reach of the outlet associ-
ated with a particular gatekeeper. Our weight-
ingmethod takes the estimated audience reach
of the outlet according to the Reuters Institute
and divides it by the number of gatekeepers
we included who are associated with the out-
let. For example, the BBC is reported to reach
78 per cent of respondents in Reuters’ survey
and has three individual gatekeepers in our
data. Therefore, the weighting score for each
gatekeeper is 78 / 3 = 26. The resulting
weighted scores aggregated to individual
movement accounts are not meaningful except
as a relative measure, and we standardise
them as a score between 0 and 100, where
users followed by no MSM gatekeepers are
assigned 0 (of which there are twenty-five),
and the individual with the highest overall
reach (the journalist Faisal Islam who was fol-
lowed by thirty-seven of our forty-seven gate-
keepers) was assigned a score of 100. A full
breakdown of the data used for this study is
available on request from the authors.
Findings
Figure 1 is a visualisation of the actors of the
Corbyn movement on Twitter, with some
accompanying network statistics. There are
two node types in this network. The darker
nodes are the movement actors identified in
our literature review, and the lighter nodes
are the accounts added based on a high level
of integration into the initial follow network.
The nodes in the network visualisation are
connected by mutual follows, so as to create a
more meaningful network structure. This is
why the musician JME is isolated from the
network—although he is followed by fifteen
of the ninety-nine other users in this network,
he does not follow any Twitter users, and
therefore has no mutual ties.
There are 7,065 connections between the
100 users. If every account here followed every
other in the network there would a total of
9,900. What network scientists call the ‘graph
density’ of the network, therefore, is 0.714,
Table 1: Outlet reach
Outlet
Reach as a percentage
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which is to say that it is around 71 per cent
complete. Considering only mutual ties within
the network reduces the graph density to 0.599
(reflecting the fact that many of the follows in
the network are not reciprocated). By anymea-
sure, this is an extremely dense network and it
is also notable that while it is possible to inter-
pret qualitatively the position of nodes at the
periphery—with traditional labour movement
actors more concentrated to the right in
Figure 1, and activist and media outriders
more to the left—the network doesn’t break
down into consistent clusters or communities.
In contrast to the Remain movement, the Cor-
byn movement contains a number of non-
professional activists and non-professional
activist organisations (seventeen in total), six
accounts that are best described as pro-Corbyn
political factions, and only one journalist
employed by a mainstream media organisa-
tion, as previously defined (Owen Jones). The
most followed user in this network is, unsur-
prisingly, Jeremy Corbyn, who was followed
by ninety-six of the users (which in the case
of this network of 100 users is also a percent-
age). The nextmost followed accounts are John
McDonnell and Clive Lewis (ninety-three), fol-
lowed by the former Labour Party General
Secretary, Jennie Formby. Ian Lavery and
Richard Burgon were followed by ninety-
two, and Laura Pidcock, Rebecca Long-Bailey,
Angela Rayner andMomentum by ninety-one.
Figure 2 is the equivalent network visualisa-
tion and statistics for the Remain movement.
This is a larger network, comprising 153 users
(sixty-seven identified from the literature
Figure 1: Visualisation of the Corbyn movement mutual follow network. Nodes: 100 (49/51),
Edges: 7,065, Density: 0.714, Mutuals Density: 0.599.
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review and the additional eighty-six users
added as described previously). As with
Figure 1, the initial set of movement actors
are the darker nodes. The network is also very
dense, although less so than the Corbynmove-
ment. As a directed follow network (in which
each users can be connected by up to two ties
in the event that both follow each other), the
overall density is 0.459. Again, the density
reduces if analysed as an undirected network
of mutual followers. In this case the network
has a density of 0.303. This means that any
given user is likely to be connected to around
half of the network, either as a follower or fol-
lowee, andwill be amutual follower of around
a third of the users (as with the Corbyn net-
work the follows are skewed towards themore
central users—hence the difference between
the two measures of graph density).
The most followed user (and the most cen-
tral figure in the mutual follows network) is
the Channel 4 journalist Faisal Islam, who is
followed by 114 (74 per cent) of the other users.
The next most followed users are the former
MP and the one time leading light of Change
UK, Chuka Umunna (110), and the former
Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, TomWat-
son (109). Overall, one very striking feature of
the Remain movement is the presence of ‘leg-
acy’ media journalists, particularly at the core
Figure 2: Visualisation of the Remain movement mutual follow network. Nodes: 153 (67/86),
Edges: 11,087, Density: 0.459, Mutuals Density: 0.303.
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of the network. In total, there are forty-two
journalists among the 152 accounts who make
up the network, suggesting already a very dif-
ferent character to that of the Corbyn move-
ment. In contrast to Corbynism, the Remain
movement at its peak contains MPs from all
the political parties represented in Parliament,
excluding the Northern Irish parties. Those
whose primary public-facing role can be cate-
gorised as a campaigner are all professionally
employed in this capacity. The network also
contains a handful of PR professionals, busi-
ness leaders and lawyers. These traits are all
in stark contrast to the character of the Corbyn
movement.
The mean average for the three measures of
communicative reach for each movement are
displayed in Table 2. The first and fourth rows
show the average figures for each movement.
These are then broken down into the initial
core users, added on the basis of the literature
review (C1 and R1), and those added on the
basis of their number of incoming and outgo-
ing network ties (C2 and R2). The headline
finding here is that the Remain movement
has a much higher level of MSM gatekeeper
following than the Corbyn movement. On
average, each actor in the Corbyn movement
on Twitter is followed by five to six MSM gate-
keepers, while actors in the Remainmovement
are followed by fourteen to fifteen. These pro-
portions are broadly similar if the audience
reach of the gatekeepers’ outlets are consid-
ered (that is, weighted reach).
Figure 3 visualises the data summarised as
mean averages in the first four columns of
Table 2 (that is, excluding the weighted reach)
for each individual account as a ‘beeswarm’
plot. The Corbyn movement is to the top of
the chart, and the Remain movement the bot-
tom. Each point here represents a Twitter
account in our data. Their position on the X
axis indicates the number of MSM gatekeepers
which follow the account. The relative size of
Table 2: Comparison of means
N Followers MSM Gatekeeper Followers Weighted Reach
Corbyn 100 96,753 5.31 13.63
C1 49 142,803 5.65 15.32
C2 51 52,508 4.98 11.99
Remain 153 229,049 14.36 38.36
R1 67 301,797 8.33 21.39
R2 86 171,707 19.11 51.75
Note: A notable divergence we see here is in the relative following of the second set of users in each movement (C2
and R2). In the case of the Corbyn movement, the first set of users have a slightly higher number of MSM gate-
keepers as followers, but in the case of Remain there is a very striking increase from R1 to R2.
Figure 3: Beeswarm plots visualising the Twitter following and MSM gatekeeper following of
each set of Twitter accounts.
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each point illustrates the size of the user’s
Twitter following (the two large points in the
Remain ‘swarm’ are Gary Lineker and Patrick
Stewart, and the two largest in the Corbyn
movement are Jeremy Corbyn and Owen
Jones). As with the network diagrams, the ini-
tial set of core actors are in the darker shade.
This visualisation shows clearly the extent to
which Remain attracted more attention from
MSMgatekeepers than the Corbynmovement.
Jeremy Corbyn, John McDonnell and Owen
Jones each had significant followings among
gatekeepers (the three relatively large darker
points furthest to the right of the top line on
the X axis), but the movement as a whole is
much more concentrated at the lower end.
Remain, meanwhile, has a number of users
with much higher gatekeeper followings than
even these three very prominent figures,
among them George Eaton who is also the
most followed member of the Corbyn move-
ment. The difference in following between
the two movements, as the case of George
Eaton suggests, is largely down to the extent
to which Remain integrated MSM journalists,
who are in turn highly followed by MSM
gatekeepers.
Conclusion
Without doubt, contemporary politics in Brit-
ain (and beyond) has been deeply shaped by
these two movements, even if neither were
ultimately successful in their goals. While the
Remain movement failed to prevent Britain’s
departure from the EU, it found considerable
success in shaping elite political discourse
and in framing an election in which Corbyn-
ism oversaw one of Labour’s worst results in
the party’s long history, after which the latter
movement lost control of the party machinery.
Given the political significance of these move-
ments, and the extent to which Twitter is, as
already mentioned, an important tool in the
modern political reporter’s arsenal, one would
expect to find both attracting considerable
attention from media gatekeepers. However,
our research shows that, at least on Twitter,
the Remain movement received far more
attention from MSM gatekeepers than
Corbynism.
What explains this finding? We can only
speculate about causality and intention with
the limited data we have, but the key
difference appears to be the number of legacy
media journalists integrated into the Remain
movement. Homophily, that ‘birds of a feather
flock together’, is a common finding within
social network analysis, including in online
networks. This applies here not only for our
two movements (which is to be expected),
but also of MSM actors. Recent scholarship
shows that journalists form very insular online
networks.14 Our findings confirm this. This
implies that any movement that successfully
integrates MSM actors (who are drawn from
a very narrow social group), can expect greater
attention from MSM gatekeepers. That the
Remain movement was more successful in
doing so is indicative of the contrasting social
character of the movements. While the Remain
movement was sociologically both more elite
and politically more aligned with the status
quo, the Corbyn movement contained actors,
including new media organisations, that are
typically found outside the purview of parlia-
mentary politics.
A number of other questions might be posed
in light of these findings: to what extent does
the disparity between the two movements
found here reflect distinct communicative
strategies or resources? Can it be said to reflect
the political instincts and preferences of MSM
gatekeepers? And/orwhat role did exogenous
political circumstances play? A satisfactory
answer—one which is beyond the scope of this
article—will have to consider both the efforts
to report and the efforts to communicate.What
we have sought to highlight, however, is the
extent to which a movement’s social media
networks matter in this regard. In examining
this question, we have also sought to demon-
strate a method for identifying and visualising
social movement actors online, and tomeasure
their potential MSM reach.
14K. Fincham, ‘Exploring political journalism homo-
phily on Twitter: a comparative analysis of US and
UK elections in 2016 and 2017’,Media and Communi-
cation, vol. 7, no. 1, 2019, pp. 213–24; F. Hanusch and
D. Nölleke, ‘Journalistic homophily on social media:
exploring journalists’ interactions with each other
on Twitter’, Digital Journalism, vol. 7, no. 1, 2019,
pp. 22–44; N. Usher and Y. M. M. Ng, ‘Sharing
knowledge and “microbubbles”: epistemic commu-
nities and insularity in US political journalism’,
Social Media and Society, vol. 6, no. 2, 2020.
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Finally, wemight also ask to what extent the
media opportunity structure that we have
revealed in this study is an explanatory factor
in a movement’s communicative strategy.
While a populist approach to communications
has been criticised by some commentators as a
reflection of a political paranoia, our findings
illustrate the extent to which the Corbyn
movement’s anti-establishment discourse has
a sociological validity.15 Compared to a con-
temporary, and to some extent, a rival move-
ment, Corbynism was indeed relatively
isolated from the gatekeepers of the main-
stream media on Twitter.
Note: The top line is the Corbyn movement,
the lower line is Remain. The darker points are
the initial users, their position on the X axis indi-
cates the number of MSM gatekeepers that fol-
lows them and the relative size of each point
illustrates the size of the user’s Twitter following.
Lewis Bassett leads seminars in politics at the
University of Manchester. Tom Mills is a lec-
turer in sociology at Aston University.
15See, for example, J.Watts and T. Bale, ‘Populism as
an intra-party phenomenon: the British Labour
Party under Jeremy Corbyn’, British Journal of Poli-
tics and International Relations, vol. 21, no. 1, 2019,
pp. 99–115.
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